Stuart Orme & John Chisholm

August 1999

1. Introduction

As part of our ongoing mission (to boldly go…) to research the evidence and try and form an accurate picture of the Jacobite army in 1745, one of the more contentious issues we have had to look at is the issue of weaponry. In this article we will try and present some of our findings and conclusions at this stage, although as ever the process of research is always carrying on.

There have been two schools of historical theory regarding this. The first sees the Highland army in some romantic glow, being broadsword-armed heroes who charge bravely to their deaths at Culloden. This is very much a Victorian image, carried over into our own time in the popular consciousness from the front of Whisky bottles, to Hollywood films such as Braveheart and Rob Roy. It is also one that the Scottish national consciousness to this day rather enjoys, and many Highland re-enactment groups north of the border continue to perpetrate this image. The other is the modern revisionist school, particularly led by Stuart Reid in his numerous books on the ’45, which claims that by the time of Culloden virtually all the Highland troops were armed with flintlock muskets. We believe (as with all these sorts of entrenched opinion), that the truth lies somewhere in between, and will demonstrate this as far as possible within this article.

We will show this by looking at this in a number of sections:

• Witnesses of the Jacobite army.

• Government Sources (where available).

• The maths doesn’t add up – where did these muskets come from?

• Conclusions and implications for Re-enactment.

Below we have reprinted some of the descriptions (along with a brief provenance) from primary sources who witnessed the Jacobite army. We think it is interesting the correlation between them, particularly in the wide variety (and quality) of the weaponry available to the Jacobites.

In a reply to Sir John Cope, John Home a government volunteer described the Highlanders shortly before they arrived in Edinburgh as follows: " …most of them seem to be strong active and hardy men; that many of them were of a very ordinary size and if clothed like lowcountry men would appear inferior to the King’s Troops; but the Highland garb favoured them much as it showed their naked limbs which were strong and muscular; that their stern countenances and bushy uncombed hair gave them a fierce, barbarous and imposing aspect. As to their arms he said that about 1400 or 1500 of them were armed with firelocks and broadswords; that their firelocks were not similar nor uniform but of all sorts and sizes muskets, fusees and fowling pieces; that some of the rest had firelocks without swords and some of them swords without firelocks; that many of their swords were not highland broadswords but French; that a company or two had each of them in his hand the shaft of a pitchfork with the blade of a scythe fastened to it somewhat like the weapon called the Lochaber axe which the town guard soldiers carry. But all of them he added would soon be provided with firelocks as the arms belonging to the trained bands of Edinburgh had fallen into their hands"

Maclean was a Captain in the Maclean regiment of the Jacobite Army, who had served in the British army first in the Independent Highland Companies, then the Black Watch. He was cashiered after killing another officer in a duel, then returned to Scotland before the ’45. " …The front rank of each clan regiment was composed of persons who were considered Gentlemen by birth, though without fortune or means…the Gentlemen in the front rank were better armed than the men in the rear rank. All the former had targets which many of the latter had not. When fully armed as was generally the case every gentleman of the front rank carried a musket and broadsword, with a pair of pistols and a dirk stuck in the belt which surrounded his body."

Crichton described the Jacobite forces whilst around Edinburgh and in Midlothian around Glencorse and along the north Esk valley, and was an Edinburgh merchant. " I observed their arms they were guns of different sizes and some of enormous length, some with butts turned up like a heron, some tied with puck thread to the stock, some without locks and some matchlocks, some had swords over their shoulder instead of guns, one or two had pitchforks and some bits of scythes on a pole with a cleek, some lochaber axes". He had watched them come "with their bagpipes and plaids rusty rapiers, matchlocks and firelocks and ragtag and bobtail was there". He said that the majority of the Highland army were "of low stature and dirty and of a contemptible appearance, a raw militia". He rated the front rank troops as " 1400 of the most daring and best militia in Europe" to whom were added " 1000 indifferent good and 1400 good for nothing old men, shepherds and boys". He gave a description of the Bristow Gate in Edinburgh under Highland control "in the keeping of these caterpillars" as he called it, saying " a boy stood with a rusty drawn sword and two fellows with things like guns of the 16 Century…catching the vermin from their lurking places about their plaids"

Scott had read many of the primary sources available, had studied the Pencuik sketches, including those no longer legible and also had interviewed a number of witnesses of the `45, as his preserved notes for the novel bear out. He said that the Highland army supplied in " picturesque wildness what it lacked in military regularity. The leading men of each clan were well armed with broadsword, target and fusee, to which all added the dirk and most added the steel pistol. But these consisted of Gentlemen that is relations of the chief, however distant and who had an immediate title to his countenance and protection finer and hardier men than these could not have been selected out of any army in Christendom…but in an inferior rank to these there were found individuals of an inferior description, the peasantry of the country who, although they did not allow themselves to be so called…bore nevertheless livery of extreme penury being indifferently accoutered and worse armed, half naked, stinted in growth and miserable in aspect…from this it happened that in bodies, the van of which were admirably well armed in their own fashion, the rear resembled actual banditti. Here was a poleaxe, there a sword without a scabbard; here a gun without a lock there a scythe set straight upon a pole; and some had only their dirks and bludgeons or stakes pulled out of hedges"

Johnstone was present in the Jacobite army during the ’45, serving as Lord George Murray’s ADC. He described the Jacobites before Prestonpans " the army was composed of about 1800 men, badly armed part of them having only bludgeons in their hands. They had found very few arms at Edinburgh as the inhabitants before the capitulation had deposited them in the castle…" At Prestonpans he said of them " …General Cope took our first line of 1200 men formed in order of battle at a distance of 200 paces from his army for bushes. Our second line of 600 men was composed of those who were badly armed, many of them as we have already observed having only staves or bludgeons in their hands. Captain MacGregor of the Duke of Perth’s regiment for want of other arms procured scythes, which he sharpened and fixed to poles of from seven to eight feet long. With these he armed his company and they proved very destructive weapons." After Prestonpans he said" The field of battle presented a spectacle of horror being covered with heads, legs, arms and mutilated bodies for the killed all fell by the sword, whilst the arms of the vanquished of which we stood in need were also of service to us."

An unknown artist near Penicuik (just outside Edinburgh) did a series of remarkable sketches of both the Government militia prior to the Jacobite arrival, the Jacobite occupation 1745-6, and the Government troops (particularly the Hessians!) which arrived later. These are the only known contemporary illustrations taken during the ’45 itself, and of the 29 illustrations of Highland troops, 17 are shown carrying broadswords of various descriptions (including two with curved Turkish blades), 10 are with muskets, and 2 with Lochaber Axes.

Government figures are equally hard to obtain. There are some descriptions given by Government officers of the Highlanders, the most famous by General Wade (who had at least seen some minor raids in Scotland whilst building roads) in 1724. ‘The arms they make use of in war, are, a Musket, a Broad Sword and Target, a pistol and a Dirk or Dagger, hanging by their side, with a Powder Horn and a Pouch for their Ammunition…. They generally give their fire at a distance, thy lay down their Arms on the ground and make a Vigorous attack with their Broad Swords…’ Wade’s description though is universally believed by Historians to only refer to the gentry at the front of the Clan, as he himself never saw a whole clan deployed for war. General Hawley described the Highlanders method of fighting after Sherrffmuir in 1715. ‘They commonly form their front rank of what they call their best men, or True Highlanders, the number of which always but few, when they form in battalions they commonly form four deep, & these Highlanders form the front of the four, the rest being lowlanders & arrant scum. When these battalions come within a large musket shot or three score yards this front rank gives their fire, and immediately throw down their firelocks and come down in a cluster with their swords and targets, making a noise and endeavouring to pierce the body or battalion before them – becoming twelve or fourteen deep by the time they come up to the people they attack.’

An analysis of the returns given by Cumberland and his successors also bears examination (Cumberland Papers in the PRO). Reports of weapons taken off the battlefield after Culloden report some 1400 swords being picked up, but only some 180 of these being described as ‘Broadswords’. The remainder may well have been Dirks, many of which had substantially long blades going by extant examples, whilst a large quantity of French swords had been shipped in with the supplies of French muskets and these may also account for many of those found. In addition at least two extant examples of weapons provenanced as being picked up in the aftermath of Culloden are nothing more than mid-17^th century munition pattern swords. Whilst it is true that Broadswords were highly prized, and therefore less likely to be dropped or more likely to be looted rather than handed in, and the large quantity of Broadswords which are extant with alleged Culloden connections would show there were a reasonable number, the figures and other contemporary descriptions above bear out the conclusion that the Basket-Hilted Broadsword was limited to quite a small proportion of the Jacobite forces. Essentially those armed with the broadsword would have been primarily those who could afford them – although some cheaper versions were made by placing basket hilts onto old blades, but really the front rankers and gentry would have had the better weapons. The returns for groups of Clansmen rounded up after the battle also bear this out. At most only 30% are broadsword armed, whilst some 65% at most are armed with muskets (the remainder seem to have nothing more than dirks, the occasional pistol or pole arm). As Stuart Reid has said ‘the use of long-bladed swords was pretty largely confined to the chieftains, gentry and some professional soldiers’. (The Highland Clansman 1689-1746)

With regard to muskets, some 1700 were picked up after Culloden, but these seem to have been taken to be of mostly Spanish or French origin (Cumberland papers). In addition further muskets were found near Stirling – some 400 of the 1600 shipped in with the French reinforcements and which seem never to have been issued (Frank McLynn – France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745). The fact that mainly continental muskets seem to have been found is borne out by Johnstone’s comments in his ‘Memoir’ on the poor quality of the British Long Land patterns picked up at Prestonpans, leading to many of them being discarded ‘as unfit for service’.

If we can demonstrate fairly conclusively that the Broadsword was limited in terms of numbers and those who had them during the ’45, this does not mean that everyone was armed with a musket either, as some have tried to claim. The evidence for this is limited – whilst the returns cited above show a significant proportion, even a majority were, this is by no means all. The simple mathematics of where the Jacobites could have potentially acquired muskets from does not bear out such an assertion. The following tries to piece together where the sources and quantities of muskets for the Jacobite army during the ’45, from what we think are the four main sources:

1. Muskets already held in the Highlands - Accurately described by Home and Crichton, these seem to be of pretty poor stock being composed of Matchlocks, old fashioned firelocks, fowling pieces, old Spanish muskets from the `15 and many pieces that sound far more dangerous to the firer than the target, assuming that they had a lock at all. In addition the Disarming Act of 1725 had set out to remove as many weapons as possible from the suspect Clans, and muskets of all weapons would be the most difficult to hide. As John Batty comments in ‘The Sword and the Sorrows’ ‘Long Guns would have been harder to conceal than pistols, therefore more pistols survive than guns. Reports show that many of the weapons handed in were of poor quality; the best no doubt would have been concealed.’
2. Muskets taken from Government arsenals - We are effectively discussing four main centres of population, Edinburgh, Carlisle, Derby and Manchester. It seems to us that any weapons taken at Manchester would have gone primarily to equip the Manchester Regiment, some 300 or so. As Manchester was essentially an overgrown village it had no castle, garrison or arsenal to speak of anyway, and consequently (as with everywhere) all that would have been left would be a very few privately owned guns. At Derby the local Yeomanry emptied the arsenal and then retreated southwards so there were few if any real pickings here either. So early on attention is drawn to Edinburgh as the significant arsenal in Scotland, possibly the only credible deposit of large numbers of muskets. However as Chevalier de Johnstone notes, most of the muskets had been spirited into the castle, and few arms were taken. Home, after leaving the city is probably assuming that they have them. However as Johnstone, as Murray’s ADC was very much in the know, and is thus more reliable. It also explains the poor equipment of large proportions of the Jacobites at Prestonpans, for they would have had over a week to distribute any arms they found before the battle, and if large numbers of muskets had been found why was over a third of an army of about 1800 armed with nothing more than staves or scythe heads on poles. There were, we know, 700 Muskets in Stirling sent there by Cope, but Stirling too held out against the Jacobites, so none were obtained there either. The only significant source of muskets from a town was when Carlisle fell, as there were around 1000 muskets held in the town by the garrison and local militia – who had emptied the arsenal to equip themselves. As stated earlier, perhaps a third of these must have disappeared in equipping the Manchester regiment.
3. Muskets taken due to combat - Here we have better evidence. Johnstone clearly states that they took weapons from Copes men and distributed them to the army. Cope lost around 1500 dead, wounded and captured giving a maximum 1500 weapons available, although as Johnstone says many of these were less than serviceable and most likely were discarded. Whilst many were probably looted by the Highlanders on the field, especially the poorly armed units at the rear, it seems inconceivable that the priority for the remaining guns was to go into Highland hands as there was a greater call on them from newly raising Lowland units; two battalions of Stoneywoods Regiment, Ogilvy`s Regiment and so on. The numbers just do not add up if you expect the Highlanders to get the lion’s share of these weapons, as politically it was also important that the Lowlanders are armed quickly, at this stage in the campaign Charles desperately needed their support and large desertions were the last thing he wanted, whereas those Clans who now arrived at least had some form of weapons of their own and would thus have been be a lesser priority. At Falkirk only some 300 prisoners (by Lord George Murray’s estimate) were taken, and a significant proportion of the Government forces retreated in good order. As such estimates of the potential guns to be seized tend to number around 500 – 600, as there was not really the time to gather guns methodically, as the Jacobite command structure degenerated into chaos and the field was more or less left to the Government forces anyway. It is difficult to see how a large number of muskets can have been taken here except through individual looting.
4. The delivery from France of 1600 weapons - here again we have some evidence and some inference. For a start we know that 400 were never issued at all and were left near Stirling (see McLynn) – where incidentally Cumberland used them later to equip newly raised Highland independent companies. Secondly the 2^nd battalion Royal Ecossois was recruited in Scotland and some of these arms went to them, another 150 taken away. That leaves around 1000 French weapons, highly prized by all accounts.

As such, taking away the muskets that were given to French or English units, this only gives us some 3700 muskets to issue to the Jacobite army. Granted there were also the guns the Highlanders had prior to the ’45, but the above figures do not take into account those guns discarded as unserviceable either, or those which were lost in the turnover of men from the high rates of desertion later in the campaign. Given that at its height the Jacobite army numbered some 7000 men (Stuart Reid’s figures), coupled with the fact that the Lowland units (some 2000 men) would have had through necessity first grab at the muskets, leads us to conclude that it is impossible for the vast majority of the Highland troops to have had guns – somewhere around 50-60% on average would seem a realistic figure if we generously allow for the Highlanders own guns prior to the ‘45.

We are sure there are people who will choose to disagree with our conclusions – that is their prerogative and with this more than perhaps many other areas of study sources are limited and there are many ‘grey areas’. Overall though we are sure the evidence supports our conclusions. As such in a re-enactment context, units should be working towards a 60% musket ratio. Having said this, this would have varied from to unit at the time and therefore should perhaps have been reflected accordingly, for instance Atholls were in from the outset of the campaign and therefore perhaps had access to more guns, so should have a higher proportion (perhaps 70%) over a unit of latecomers like Frasers. This doesn’t mean that we should work to a strict ratio and ban people from obtaining guns either – far from it, the more muskets the better in my view. It means that we should recognize the historical context we are trying to portray and ensure we have a representative sample of Highland weaponry amongst our troops – lochaber axes, scythes on poles and the odd matchlock are just as historically accurate as an M1734 pattern French musket, and people shouldn’t have to be forced into having a gun either. One thing which should be curtailed somewhat is the profusion on Highland broadswords, certainly of any quality, as they do seem to have been limited to the Front Rankers – so if you haven’t got the kit to match, don’t carry one!

One further point is that although muskets were highly prized by the Highlanders (when they could get hold of them), this was because guns were associated with being a ‘proper soldier’. This does NOT mean that the Highlanders were ready to engage in a prolonged volley fire. For a start most were only issued with 12 rounds for the entire campaign (Harrington – Culloden 1746), and even the less tactically gifted in the Jacobite army recognized that the only real tactic the Highlanders could follow was the charge. As O’Sullivan pointed out ‘Any man that served with the highlanders, knows that they fire but one shot & abandon their firelocks after. If there be any obstruction that hinders them of going on the enemy all is lost; they don’t like to be exposed to the enemy’s fire, nor can they resist it, not being trained to charge [load] as fast as regular troops, especially the English which are the troops in the world that fires best.’

As such we are not realistically likely to portray prolonged volley fire (unlike the redcoats) – which I know is a disappointment to all those who like burning black powder! Instead we are talking about individual shots as the Highlanders advance, then a ragged volley before the final charge. This also means that battle should not really be any longer than 15 minutes (none in the ’45 were – including Culloden if you discount the cannonade), which obviously has real implications for us as a Society (i.e. Lace Wars) in the way we conduct our displays.

Sources

Bailey, Geoff - Falkirk or Paradise! - The Battle of Falkirk Muir 17th January 1746 (Edinburgh 1996)

Black, Jeremy - Culloden and the ‘45 (Alan Sutton 1990)

Brown, Iain & Cheape, Hugh - Witness to Rebellion - John Maclean’s journal of the ‘45 and the Penicuik Drawings (Tuckwell Press 1996)

Harrington, Peter - Culloden 1746 (Osprey 1991)

Hook, Richard & Ross, Walter - The ‘Forty-Five (HMSO 1995)

Johnstone, Chevalier de - Memoirs of the ‘Forty-Five (London 1958)

Lenman, Bruce - The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689 - 1746 (London 1980)

McLynn, Frank - France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh 1981)

McLynn, Frank - The Jacobite Army in England (Edinburgh 1983)

Prebble, John - Culloden (Penguin 1961)

Reid, Stuart - Like Hungry Wolves - Culloden 1746 (B & W 1995)

Reid, Stuart - 1745 - a Military History (London 1996)

Reid, Stuart - The Highland Clansman 1689 - 1746 (Osprey 1997)

Speck, W. A. - The Butcher, The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the ‘45 (Welsh Academic Press 1995)

Tomasson, K. & Buist, F. - Battles of the ‘Forty-Five (London 1962)

Various – Culloden – The Swords and the Sorrows (National Trust for Scotland, 1996)